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INTRODUCTION
The race model has been the darling of patent economists and
game theorists.1 This model assumes that the winner, namely the first
to invent, takes the patent grant with the market dominance that
comes with it, whereas the second comer, in the best tradition of
sports contests, obligingly accepts her loss and quietly vanishes from
the scene. While the sports analogy has provided a useful framework
for understanding the economics of invention, it has obfuscated an
important aspect of the inventive process: the possibility of strategic
publication of research findings in order to prevent the issuance of a
patent to a competitor. Captured by the sports analogy, patent schol
ars have consistently presupposed that the loser of a patent race must
behave in a sportsmanlike fashion and gracefully accept her fate. But

* Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. LL.B 1994, Hebrew Univer
sity of Jerusalem; LL.M. 1995, Boalt Hall School of Law; J.S.D. 1998, Yale Law School. Ed. I am indebted to Ian Ayres, Talia Bar, Avi Bell, Jenny Lanjouw, Peter Siegelman, Jill
Fisch, Zahar Goshen, Yael Lustmann, Steve Thel, Joel Reidenberg, Ben Zipursky, Mark
Patterson, Hugh Hansen, and participants at the business law seminar at Fordham Law
School for invaluable comments and contributions.

1. See, e.g., J EAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 394-414
(1988); ERIC RASMUS EN, GAMES AND INFORMATION 341-48 (2d ed. 1994); see also
Giovanni De Fraja, Strategic Spillovers in Patent Races, 11 INT'LJ. INDUS. ORG. 139 (1993);
Jennifer F. Reinganum, A Dynamic Game of R&D: Patent Protection and Competitive Be·
havior, 50 ECONOMETRICA 671 (1982); Partha Dasgupta & Joseph Stiglitz, Uncertainty, In·
dustria/ Structure, and the Speed of R&D, 11 BELL J. ECON. 1 (1980); Tom Lee & Louis L.
Wilde, Market Structure and Innovation: A Refonnulation, 94 QJ. ECON. 429 (1980); Glenn
C. Loury, Market Structure and Innovation, 93 QJ. ECON. 395 (1979).
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there is no reason whatsoever why competition in the inventive field
should conform to the rules of sports.2
The stakes and payoff matrices of patent races are considerably
different from those of sports contests, and, thus, it is only natural to
expect firms in a patent race to deviate from the norms of fair compe
tition in sports. The nature of patent races is much more complex
than that of other races. Ceding a patent to a competitor may often
spell a substantial drop in revenues for the losing firm, and in some
cases may even drive the loser out of the market.3 Therefore, trying to
win the race may not always be the profit-maximizing strategy.
Rather, in many patent races the superior strategy for one or more of
the competing firms would be to prevent other firms from winning the
race by publishing their research findings. Recharacterizing patent
races in this way implies that firms that are about to lose in a patent
race often face a dilemma all too familiar to academics, the choice of
"publish or perish."
The possibility of preemptive publication inheres in every patent
system. The point and purpose of the patent grant is to reward inno
vation.4 Yet, not all types of innovation are eligible for reward: only
inventions that constitute a nontrivial contribution over the prior art
qualify for patent protection.5 This trait of patent protection intro
duces an important element of relativity into the patent system, turn
ing the prior art into the reference point against which new patents are
evaluated. Thus, firms have the power to affect the patentability of
their rivals' inventions by altering the state of the prior art. Because
any publication immediately becomes part of the prior art, the strategy
of preemptive publication allows a firm to render an otherwise
nonobvious invention obvious and, as a result, unpatentable. Re
turning momentarily to the sports analogy, it can be said that preemp-

2. Preemptive publication may also be useful to firms - whether in a race or not - that
do not wish to incur the considerable cost of obtaining a patent, but want to retain free ac
cess to their R&D. In the same vein, preemptive publication is useful to firms estimating
that a competitor is about to patent one of the publishing firm's trade secrets. Publishing, in
this case, will enable the firm to keep using the process or innovation.

3. A case in point is the famous race between Amgen and Genetic Institute over the
exclusive right to market erythropoietin (EPO) in the United States. Each of the companies
patented the technique it developed for producing EPO and sued the other for infringing its
patent. At trial, the court held the patents of both companies not invalid and infringed. See
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., Ltd., 706 F. Supp. 94 (D. Mass. 1989). On appeal, the
Federal Circuit reversed in part, holding that while Amgen's patent was indeed valid and
infringed, Genetic Institute's patent was invalid. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co.,
Ltd., 927 F2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). This decision effectively granted the United States
EPO market to Amgen.
4. Or, in the language of the Constitution, "[t]o Promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 8.
5. See Pearce v. Mulford, 102 U.S. 112, 118 (1880) ("[A]ll improvement is not invention,
and entitled to protection as such.").
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tive publication shifts the goalpost of patentability, or, more accu
rately, raises the patentability bar.
A simple example may help illustrate the point. Assume that two
firms, A and B, compete for a new computer chip. Suppose that A has
say, a chip
an invention that is a clear improvement over prior art
design that is 10% faster than the best chip now available. Although,
in principle, A's invention is eligible for a patent, B's involvement in
the race may block the patent to A. B can prevent A from obtaining
the patent by publishing its design for a 5% faster chip, which, al
though it is not enough to procure a patent for B, is enough to block
A's innovation, making it no longer a significant improvement over
prior art.
The Patent Act employs two mechanisms to ensure that only in
ventions constituting a real inventive leap over the prior art are re
warded: novelty and nonobviousness. The novelty requirement, as
embodied in § 102, denies patentability to inventions that were known,
used, or described in a printed publication or a patent application at
any time prior to filing.6 The nonobviousness requirement, codified in
§ 103, reinforces the novelty requirement by limiting patentability to
inventions that truly enhance social utility.7 Together these require
ments ensure the basic tradeoff patent law seeks to promote: disclo
sure of substantially new information in exchange for a limited mo
nopoly grant. At the same time, they also enable the strategy of
preemptive publication.
While the novelty and nonobviousness requirements make the
strategy of preemptive publication theoretically possible, the nature of
the inventive process itself makes it practically feasible. From a prac
tical standpoint, the strategy of preemptive publication is made possi
ble by the lag that exists between the time a firm obtains sufficient re
search results to effect a change in the prior art and the time it perfects
the invention. Under the "first to invent" rule that prevails in the
United States, the first firm to reduce an invention to practice is enti
tled, as a general rule, to patent protection.8 An invention can be re
duced to practice either constructively or actively. A constructive re-

6. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 {1994).
7. See 3 5 U.S.C. § 103 {1994).
8. For a classic statement of the priority rule,see Christie v. Seybold, 55 F. 69 {6th Cir.
1893). Unless the inventor can prove an earlier date, the date of filing is considered the date
of reduction to practice for purposes of priority. See id. at 7 5 . The only exception to the
general rule stated above is a case in which the second to reduce to practice can show: (1)
that she conceived the invention first; and (2) that she was reasonably diligent in reducing
her invention to practice. See id. at 76. The practical importance of the exception has
proven to be rather miniscule. The process by which priority between two inventors is being
determined in such cases is called "interference." Historically, only 0.1% of the applications
required. an interference process, and of those, the "junior party," the second to file, pre
vailed in fewer than 0 33 %. See Ian A. Calvert & Michael Sofocleous, Interference Statistics
for Fiscal Years1992to1994, 17 J. PAT. [&TRADEMARK] OFF. SOC'Y 417,421 tbl.4 {1995).
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duction to practice occurs when the patent application is filed. An ac
tive reduction requires a showing that at some earlier date the inven
tion actually "work[ed] for its intended purpose."9 Thus, a firm that
elects to pursue a patent must develop a "working model" of the in
vention. By contrast, a firm that chooses to publish need only possess
certain theoretical results that enable the invention, and sometimes
even less. Any publication of results may, in principle, raise the
nonobviousness standard enough to spoil a patent for a competitor.
The ability to adversely affect the patentability of rivals' inventions
through publication explains the otherwise peculiar practice of com
mercial firms that routinely publish research results in scientific and
technological journals. While firms engaging in research and devel
opment ("R&D") ultimately wish to obtain patent protection, their
research results often fall short of supporting a patent application. In
many cases research does lead to improvements over the prior art, but
those improvements are insufficient to satisfy the . nonobviousness
standard. Although minor improvements over the prior art cannot se
cure a patent grant, they are by no means valueless. The publication
of such results alters the chances of rival firms reaching the patent
mark and is, thus, of value to the publishing firm.
A firm will choose to publish its research results whenever it be
lieves - correctly or incorrectly10 - that its competitors are likely to
beat it to the patent application. Three reasons might account for such
a belief. First, a firm may estimate that its rivals are at a more ad
vanced stage in their research, either because they started earlier or
because their human resources are superior. Second, due to imperfect
9. Estee Lauder Inc. v. L'Oreal, S.A, 129 F.3d 58 8, 593 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The United
States is the only country in the world that follows the "first-to-invent" rule; all other coun
tries have adopted the "first-to-file" rule, which determines priority between inventions ac
cording to the date of filing, regardless of who invented first. The United States has consis
tently declined the invitation to join tlte rest of tlte world by adopting a "first-to-file " rule.
Yet, tlte pressure to effect tltis change persists. Several commentators have suggested tltat
switching to a "first-to-file" rule will have virtually no practical implications. See, e.g.,
Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Vivian S. Kuo, World Patent System Circa 20XX, AD., 38 IDEA
529, 549 (1998) (arguing tltat "tlte United States now has a virtual first-to-file system").
However, switching to a "first-to-file " rule does have an important implication when tlte
possibility of preemptive publication is considered. The "first-to-file" rule extends tlte pe
riod during which a preemptive publication is possible, and tltus gives an advantage to in
tended publishers over intended patentees.
10. Because firms in a patent race operate in an environment of imperfect information,
tltey may have an incorrect belief as to one or more of tlte following factors affecting tlte
publication decision. First, a firm may wrongly believe tltat it is involved in a patent race,
whereas in fact it is not. This can happen, for instance, when two firms compete for a new
drug for treating a certain disease, but each of tltem is developing a different product. Sec
ond, a firm may be incorrect in assessing its ability to beat its competitors to tlte sought-after
patent. Finally, a firm may be incorrect in overestimating tlte research skills, or tlte success,
of its competitors. Therefore, a firm may sometimes decide to publish even tltough it is not
in its best interest to do so. The possibility of reaching a mistaken decision weakens to some
extent tlte incentive to publish, but it does not elintinate it altogetlter. It is just anotlter fac
tor a firm must take into account in deciding on an appropriate strategy.

930

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:926

access to financial markets, a firm may believe that other firms are
able to obtain financing at a lower cost and, as a consequence, file for
a patent more quickly. Finally, and relatedly, a firm may prioritize its
research projects in a way that prevents it from fully engaging in a par
ticular patent race. In all these instances a firm may find it in its best
interest to become a spoiler by resorting to the strategy of preemptive
publication.
Preemptive publication offers two important benefits. First, it pre
vents a rival firm from acquiring an important competitive edge. Pre
emptive publication enables the publishing firm to block a rival from
obtaining a patent and thereby maintain its market position. Fur
thermore, if the rival firm expended more money on R&D in an at
tempt to win the patent race, preemptive publication would give the
publishing firm a relative advantage over its competitor. Although
sunk costs do not on their own affect the relative positions of the firms
vis-a-vis present projects, it may affect their financial ability to engage
in other research projects in the future. Second, preemptive publica
tion allows the publishing firm to use the information it published in
future projects at no cost. In the absence of such a publication, the
patent bars all others from using the information disclosed in the pat
ent application without a license from the winning firm. Preemptive
publication obviates the need to negotiate such a license. Further
more, preemptive publication makes it possible for the publishing firm
to eventually obtain a patent on variants of the original invention or, as they are called in the jargon of patent law, "improvements."
This Article explores the strategy of preemptive publication in
patent races and evaluates its welfare implications. In particular, this
Article offers three novel insights. First, it demonstrates, contrary to
prevailing theory, that the strategy of preemptive publication some
times dominates the strategy of attempting to win the patent race. An
important implication is that firms engaged in a patent race can make
a credible threat of publishing their research results and thereby force
the likely patentee to negotiate a licensing agreement with them prior
to receiving the patent.11 Significantly, this result alters the prevailing
understanding of patent races as "winner take all" games because
even second comers may indirectly obtain a share of the patent grant.
Second, and relatedly, this Article shows that recourse to preemptive
publication can lead to an equilibrium in which none of the competing
firms receives a patent. However, no patent will issue in such cases
not because the desirable invention cannot be produced, but rather
because the knowledge underlying the invention had been made pub
lic before its completion. Finally, the Article argues that preemptive

11. Such licensing agreements may have antitrust implications,depending on the impor
tance of the invention and the market positions of the parties involved. A detailed discus
sion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
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publication is likely to promote economic efficiency in industries, such
as biotechnology, that depend on access to basic research, and in net
work markets since it makes valuable information available to the
public without the attendant cost of limited monopoly.
In addition, the normative analysis in this Article indicates that an
innovation policy that overlooks the option of preemptive publication
will be suboptimal in that it will set the obviousness standard too high.
A high obviousness standard is socially desirable as it sifts out trivial
innovations from meaningful ones, but at the same time it increases
the opportunity for preemptive publication and may thus unduly di
minish the incentive to innovate.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I explains the economic
rationale underlying preemptive publication and the legal rules ena
bling it. Part II constructs a formal model to explain when firms will
choose to publish their research findings and then sets forth the condi
tions under which preemptive publication dominates the strategy of
regular competition for a patent. Part III analyzes the welfare effects
of preemptive publication. Finally, Part IV introduces and explores
the possibility of "the double preemption twist" - a defensive ma
neuver in which the anticipated winner of the patent race publishes
first to shield itself from preemptive publication by a rival.
I.

THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL RULES

OF PATENT RACES

The optimal strategy for a firm in a patent race is to maximize its
expected profits in all possible states of the world. In the present con
text, the two relevant states are: a world with patent protection, and a
world without. Given that the issuance of a patent is a probabilistic
event that depends on the research skills of the firm, its investment
level, and often on luck, no firm can rationally assume thatit is going
to win every patent race in which it engages. Consequently, in many
cases the best strategy for firms is not to try to win every patent race
they enter, but, rather, to quit the race and maximize their profits
without patent protection.12
Curiously, existing models of patent races have focused exclusively
on the option of winning the patent and, as a result, have overlooked
the important ramifications of losing a patent race.13 Yet, no profit-

12. It is important to note that the investment in R&D is a sunk cost that a firm engaged
in a patent race necessarily incurs regardless of the strategy it chooses to pursue.
13. Of the various race models, the most influential is the "memoryless model" of
Dasgupta and Stiglitz. See Dasgupta & Stiglitz, supra note 1. The model assumes identical
firms with continuous investment in R&D. Furthermore, it assumes that the probability of
making a patentable breakthrough depends only on a firm's current decisions as to R&D
investment - past investments that failed to yield a patentable invention are completely
wasted. Although this assumption is rather unrealistic, it has become the standard assump
tion in the economic literature on patent races. See De Fraja, supra note 1, at 141.
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maximizing firm can afford to do the same - losing a patent race en
tails not only a loss of considerable investment in R&D, but also a
substantial drop in profits because its rival can introduce a superior
product in the market. Thus, at any point in time following the initial
decision to join a patent race, a firm would choose to pursue the op
tion of patenting only if it estimates that the expected payoff from
patenting is higher than the expected payoff from quitting the race and
publishing its research findings. Or, formally, a firm would continue in
a race, IFF pwin *(Net ProfitlWin) > Piose *(Net Profit!Lose).
Importantly, a firm's probability of winning a patent race is en
dogenous to the race itself - victory is contingent not only on the
firm's ability to successfully complete the invention, but also on its
ability to do so before the other entrants in the race. Thus, the ex
pected payoff of a firm in a patent race depends to a large extent on
the research results of its rivals. Naturally, if a firm estimates that its
likelihood of winning the race is higher than that of all other firms, it
should generally compete to the end.14 If, on the other hand, a firm es
timates that its probability of winning is lower than that of even one of
its competitors, then its optimal strategy changes radically. Rather
than maximizing its investment in R&D in an attempt to preserve its
lead in the race, a firm estimating that it will lose should attempt to
maximize its expected profits in the absence of patent protection.
Such polarized profit-maximizing strategies are dictated by the very
nature of patent races, which rewards only the first-comer while of
fering no consolation prizes to second-comers.
Preemptive publication is probably the most powerful defensive
strategy a firm can employ in the face of an imminent reduction to
practice by a competitor. Rather than conceding a loss and allowing a
competitor to gain monopoly power in a certain product or process
market, a firm in possession of sufficient research results15 can bar its
competitor from obtaining the patent by publishing the information it
holds. The possibility of preemptive publication derives from the very
principles animating the patent system, which is predicated on a fun
damental tradeoff of information for limited monopoly power.16 Be
cause patents come at a cost to society, the patent system rewards only
new inventions; granting a patent to an already existing invention
makes no economic sense.17 Furthermore, even if an invention is
14. The analysis in this Article shows,however,that even a firm estimating that its
probability of winning is higher than that of all other firms should not always attempt to win
the patent since it remains exposed to the risk of preemptive publication.
15. For a discussion of what constitutes "sufficient research results," see infra text ac
companying notes 22-23.
16. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg,Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017,1028 (1989).
17. See DONALD s. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 335 (1998).
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novel, it may nevertheless be ineligible for a patent if it is anticipated
by the prior art. Thus, to qualify for a patent, an invention must make
a meaningful contribution to the existing pool of knowledge18 and be
considerably different from the prior art.19 The Patent Act pursues
this policy through the requirements of novelty and nonobviousness.
The novelty requirement denies patent protection to an invention
that was known, used, or described in a printed publication, in the
United States or elsewhere before the date of invention. Accordingly,
any printed publication preceding the date of invention, even by the
slightest of margins, will suffice to bar an invention from receiving a
patent. However, a publication does not necessarily have to describe
an invention identical to the one for which a patent is sought in order
to block it from obtaining a patent; all that the publication must do is
render the invention obvious to a person skilled in the relevant art.
Aptly described as the "final gatekeeper of the patent system," 20 the
nonobviousness requirement withholds patent protection from minor
improvements.21 The nonobviousness requirement ensures that only
meaningful innovation - innovation that represents a sufficiently
large technical advance over the prior art22 - is rewarded by the pat
ent system. Thus, if the prior art renders a particular invention trivial,
the innovation is ineligible for a patent.
The interdependence between the patentability of new inventions
and the state of the prior art creates a unique opportunity for firms to
affect the patentability of their rivals' invention not by competing with
them "head on" for the patent grant, but rather by altering the state of
the prior art. To see this clearly, it is helpful to quantify the nonobvi
ousness requirement in terms of innovation increments.2 3 For exam
ple, one could imagine a patent system in which inventors are required
to improve upon the prior art by 10 innovation increments in order for
an invention to be patentable. Under this rule, whenever a firm esti-

18. See id.
19. See id. at 335, 531.
20. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 479 (2d ed. 1997).
21. The nonobviousness examination, as formulated by the Supreme Court in the land
mark case of Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), consists of three steps. First, the
court has to determine "the scope and content of the prior art." Then, it must identify "the
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue." Finally, the court has to deter
mine the "level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art" at the time the invention was made and
decide whether the claimed invention would have been obvious at the time of invention to a
person of ordinary skill in the art. Id. at 17.
The Court added that the nonobviousness determination may be aided by "secondary
considerations" such as "commercial success, long felt but unsolved need, failure of others,
etc., [that] might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the
subject matter sought to be patented." Id. at 17-18.
22. See MERGES, supra note 20, at 479.
23. I am indebted to Ian Ayres for this idea.
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mates that its rival is about to attain the requisite 10-increment stan
dard, it can publish some information that improves the state of the art
by 1 innovation increment, thereby spoiling its rival's plan to obtain a
patent. Of course, nonobviousness is difficult to quantify in the real
world, but the more general point remains valid: preemptive publica
tion enables firms to play the role of the spoiler by raising the patent
ability bar.
To be sure, not every reference to an invention in a written publi
cation will render the invention unpatentable.24 Only a reference that
contains an enabling disclosure of an invention negates patentability.
Technically, this has been accomplished by the importation of the en
ablement requirement of § 112 into the novelty standard of § 102.25
Under § 112, a publication is considered enabling if it discloses suffi
cient information to allow a person skilled in the art to produce the in
vention.26 Thus, to constitute a bar to patentability, a reference must
describe an invention in sufficient detail and accuracy; a merely sug
gestive reference will not do.
While the requirement of enabling disclosure restricts to some ex
tent the ability of firms to preemptively publish their research results,
it by no means eliminates it. The publishing firm enjoys four advan
tages over the patenting firm. First, any publication sufficiently acces
sible to the public interested in the art qualifies as a prior art refer
ence.27 A publication need neither pass exacting peer review nor be
published in a prominent scientific or technological journal; even a
publication in the firm's own journal will suffice if the public may ac
cess it.28 Second, and relatedly, publications are not subject to strict
24. Adopting such a rule would dramatically undermine the incentive to engage in R& D
and, thus, would diminish social welfare.
25. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).

26. See, e.g., Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 555 (1870) (holding that in or
der to constitute an anticipatory reference, a publication must "contain and exhibit a sub
stantial representation of the patented improvement, in such full, clear, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art or science to which it appertains, to make, construct, and
practice the invention"); see also Paperless Accounting, Inc. v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Sys.,
804 F.2d 659, 665 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("[E]ven if the claimed invention is disclosed in a printed
publication, that disclosure will not suffice as prior art if it was not enabling."); ARTIIUR R.
MILLER &MICHAE LH. DAVIS, INTELLECTUALPROPERTY: PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, A ND
COPYRIGHT IN A NUTSHELL46, 47 (1983).
27. See Constant v. Advanced Micro- Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1566-69 (Fed. Cir.
1988) ("If accessibility is proved, there is no requirement to show that particular members of
the public actually received the information.").
28. See, for example, In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986), in which the Federal
Circuit stated that public accessibility is the "touchstone in determining whether a reference
constitutes a 'printed publication.' " A review of the case law reveals that indexing is the key
factor in determining public accessibility. For example, in In re Hall, the court held that a
doctoral dissertation that had been deposited and indexed in a German library was suffi
ciently accessible to constitute a printed publication. See id. at 899-900. By contrast, in In re
Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A 1978), it was held that a thesis that had been catalogued but
not indexed could not serve as a prior art reference.
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examination of the Patent Office �-d thus need not be as accurate and
specific as patent applications. .Cop.sequently, the publishing firm
may, in principle, offer several ways to produce an invention, thereby
increasing the probability of preemption. Third, even a publication
that does not, on its own, trivialize an invention may still make it un
patentable in combination with other prior art references.29 Thus, all a
publication need to do is contribute the "marginal obviousness incre
ment" to the prior art in order to block a patent. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, the publishing firm is favored by the "hindsight
bias."
The hindsight bias is a cognitive effect that causes people to "exag
gerate what could have been anticipated in foresight ... [and] to view
[what has happened] as having appeared 'relatively inevitable' before
it happened." 30 Significantly, empirical studies in cognitive psychology
have repeatedly demonstrated that as a consequence of the hindsight
bias, we tend to overestimate, ex post, the ex ante predictability of
events that actually occurred.31 Although no empirical tests have been
29. The permissibility of combining references is what distinguishes the obviousness in
quiry from the novelty inquiry. As Judge Lourie explicated in Pro-Mold & Tool Co. v.
Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 15 F3d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996):
If one prior art reference describes the claimed invention, it is worse than obvious in terms
of patentability; it lacks novelty. If the invention is different from what is disclosed in one
reference, but the differences are such that combination with another reference would lead
to what is claimed, the obviousness question then requires inquiry into whether there is rea
son, suggestion, or motivation [in the prior art] to make that combination.

Id. at 1573. Thus, courts will not automatically combine prior art references when making an
obviousness determination, but rather look to other factors existent at the time. Such a sug
gestion may be explicit, see, e.g., In re Semaker, 702 F.2d 989, 994 (Fed. Cir. 1983), or im
plicit, see, e.g., In re Nilssen, 851 F.2d 1401, 1403 (Fed. Cir. 1988), in the prior art literature.
It may also derive from the knowledge of those skilled in the relevant art, see, e.g., Ashland
Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 297 n.24 (Fed. Cir. 1985), or from
the nature of the problem to be solved, see, e.g., In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1054
{C.C.P.A. 1976).

30. Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in
Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 335, 341 {Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
31. See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight [not =] Foresight: The Effect of Outcome
Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXP. PSYCHOL, 288 {1975) (first to identify
the hindsight bias); see also Jay JJ. Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia Fobian Willham, The
Hindsight Bias: A Meta-analysis, 48 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 147, 147-48 (1991); Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judg
ments of Past Events After the Outcomes Are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311, 312 {1990);
Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post¢ Ex Ante, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89
{1995); Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinations of Negligence and the Hindsight
Bias, 20 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 501 {1996). For possible ways to eliminate the hindsight bias
in legal, and other settings, see, for example, Hal R Arkes et al., Eliminating the Hindsight
Bias, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 305, 306 {1988); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1523-33 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A
Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 615 (1998);
David B. Wexler & Robert F. Schopp, How and When to Correct for Juror Hindsight Bias in
Mental Health Malpractice Litigation: Some Preliminary Observations, 7 BEHAv. SCI. & L.
485, 496 {1989).
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conducted to evaluate the influence of the hindsight bias on nonobvi
ousness determinations,32 its applicability to such determinations is in
disputable. Indeed, the case law on nonobviousness reveals that
courts have been especially conscious of not falling prey to the hind
sight bias,33 even looking to objective criteria - such as the commer
cial success of the invention - in an attempt to avoid it.34 Yet, there is
no proof that the courts' cautionary approach has helped in overcom
ing the hindsight bias. Between 1982 and 1 994, the Federal Circuit in
validated approximately 30% of the patents litigated before it for lack
of novelty or obviousness, even though they had been approved by the
Patent Office.35 Furthermore, several leading commentators have ob
served that the correlation between the secondary considerations used
by the courts and the nonobviousness of inventions may often be quite
tenuous.36 Thus, it seems, at the end of the day, that the hindsight bias
still gives potential "publishers" an important advantage over poten
tial patentees.
II.

PATENT RACES WITH PREEMPTIVE PUBLICATION

This Part demonstrates that preemptive publication may dominate
the strategy of pursuing a patent in all race settings. Broadly speaking,
there can be two types of race settings: symmetric races and asymmet
ric races. A race is symmetric when the two competing firms are iden
tical in their research capabilities, financing capabilities, and timing
decisions. A race is asymmetric when one of the competing firms has

32 See Rachlinski, supra note 31, at 614.
33. See, e.g., Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Prod. Co., 840 F.2d 902, 907
(Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Care must be taken to avoid hindsight reconstruction ...."); Panduit
Corp. v.Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("It is not appropriate for
the Court to engage in hindsight."); W.L. Gore & Assoc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540,
1553 (Fed. Cir.1983) ("It is difficult but necessary that the decisionmaker forget what he or
she has been taught at trial about the claimed invention and cast the mind back to the time
the invention was made .... ).
34. For example, Rachlinski notes that the Supreme Court's invocation of "secondary
considerations" in Graham v John Deere Co, 383 U.S.1, 17 (1966), stemmed, at least in part,
from the Court's desire to neutralize the hindsight bias. See Rachlinski, supra note 31, at
614.
35. See Donald R.Dunner et al., A Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit's Patent Deci
sions: 1982-1994, 5 FED. CIRCUIT BJ. 151, 163-68 (1995). Historically, the invalidation rate
was even higher. For example, between 1921 and 1973, district courts invalidated 55% of the
patents challenged, and the courts of appeals invalidated 65%. See A.Samuel Oddi, Beyond
Obviousness: Invention Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1097,
1140 n.241 (1989).
36. In fact, several leading commentators have questioned the wisdom of reliance on
secondary considerations in determining nonobviousness. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges,
Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L.
REV. 803, 823-24 (1988) (noting that commercial success is not a reliable test of the
nonobviousness of the invention). Factors such as commercial success and other secondary
considerations may often be poor indications of the obviousness of an invention.
"
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an advantage over the other, perhaps because it has superior human
resources, it invests more in R&D, or it started research earlier.
In order to analyze the effects of preemptive publication on sym
metric and asymmetric public races, I will construct, in the following
Sections, a game theoretic model of a patent race. Through the
model, I will compare conventional theorizing of patent races - one
that ignores preemptive publication - with one that takes preemptive
publication into account.
A.

Model of a Symmetric Race

To illustrate the impact of preemptive publication on patent races,
it is helpful to think of a simple inventive setting in which two firms
compete for a patent. For example, one can imagine two new phar
maceutical firms, A and B, engaged in a competition for a new drug.
To conduct research for the new drug, each firm must invest $1 ini
tially, and then, depending on the outcome of the first stage of re
search, it may choose to invest another $1 to conduct additional re
search. After two stages of research, each firm has to choose among
three options: file for a patent, publish its research results, or do
nothing (namely, keep its results secret), with the decision depending
on the research results each firm ultimately obtains. Assume that if
one of the firms receives a patent, it will obtain sole possession of the
market and will make a monopoly profit of $20. The other firm, in
this case, will earn no profit, as the patent will legally bar it from pro
ducing the drug. Thus, the payoff to the patenting firm is $20, and the
payoff to the loser is $0.
Assume further that if either firm can bar its rival from obtaining a
patent by publishing its research results, the two firms will divide the
market evenly with each of them making a duopoly profit of $8.37
Thus, the symmetric payoff in the case of publication is $8.38 The as
sumption here is that by removing the legal barrier of the patent, the
publishing firm will be able, at a later stage, to manufacture the new
drug, which, in turn, will enable it to share the market with the other
firm and earn a positive profit.39 The model also accounts for the pos-

37. This assumption that a monopoly profit is higher than twice the duopoly profit is
consistent both with the Bertrand model and the Cornot model of duopoly (assuming linear
demand curve and constant marginal cost). In reality, the payoff of the competing firms
from publication may be much lower than the duopoly profit Publication enables all comers
to use the information published and thus benefits all firms currently on the market as well
as potential entrants.
38. As explained below, I assume that a firm will choose to publish only if its rival will
otherwise receive a patent. In other words, a firm will publish only if by so doing it will spoil
a patent to its rival. If neither firm obtained sufficient research results to file for a patent,
neither will publish. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
39. In reality, the firm that was on the verge of patenting will have an advantage over its
rival because it will have the advantage of being first on the market. Thus, the payoffs of the
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sibility that neither firm yields sufficient research results to produce
the new drug - namely, the possibility of a failed attempt - in which
case each firm will earn a payoff of $0 and lose its investment in R&D
(either $1 or $2).
I will represent the race for the new drug as a simple, highly styl
ized, die-game between the two competing firms. Because luck plays
such an important role in the inventive process, it is useful to analogize
patent races to die-games. Imagine that instead of conducting re
search, the two competing firms engage in a die-game in which a $1
investment (representing the investment in R&D) buys them one roll
of a special die with the number 1 on three of its faces, and the num
ber4 on the remaining three. Thus, every roll yields a 0.5 probability
of getting a 1, and a 0.5 probability of getting a 4. Assume that the
numbers 1 and4 represent innovation increments. Accordingly, a roll
of4 enables a firm to improve on the prior art by four innovation in
crements, and a roll of 1 by one innovation increment. To obtain a
patentable result - a result that is both novel and nonobvious - un
der this game, a firm needs to attain a total of at least 6 innovation in
crements.40 Any lesser result (a total of 2 or 5) will fail to satisfy the
obviousness standard.
Finally, assume that the game proceeds in two rounds of four
stages. At stage I, each firm must decide whether to invest $1 to earn
the right to roll. At stage II, each firm that decided to invest gets to
roll the die. At stage III, each firm learns of the other firm's result.
Finally, at stage IV, each firm decides whether to "move" - patent,
publish, or do nothing - or play another round for an additional cost
of $1.
I will analyze the probable outcomes of the game under two legal
regimes: a regime that ignores the possibility of publication, and a re
gime that takes publication into account. Under the first regime,
which prohibits preemptive publication, a patent will issue any time
one or more firms attain a total of 6 or more,41 and nothing will hap
pen otherwise. Under the second regime, a patent will issue only
when either firm attains a total of at least 6 and the other firm cannot
block the patent by publishing its results (namely, when one firm at
tains 8 and the other has 2 or less); or when both attain a total of 6 or
more. Under this regime, a firm will elect to publish whenever doing
firms may in many cases not be identical. This, however, does not affect the generality of the
results of the model, since the main point here is that publication may yield a positive payoff
to the firm trailing in the race.
40.

Or, more precisely, to patent under this game, a firm needs a 4 on both rolls (a total

ofS).
41. If both firms attained a total of 8 they will divide the patent evenly between them .
Or, put differently, each firm will get the whole of the patent with equal probability. For
instance, they may flip a coin, or even roll a die, to decide which firm will receive the patent.
Thus, they will each earn a profit of $10.
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so spoils a patent for its rival - namely, when publication will prevent
the rival from attaining the necessary six increment margin over the
prior art. If a fintt can neither patent nor block the issuance of a pat
ent to its rival, it will choose to do nothing.42 The equilibria of the
game under a "no-publication regime" are listed in Table 1, and the
equilibria of the game under a regime with publication are listed in
Table2.
TABLE 1: SYMMETRIC GAME WITHOUT PREEMPTIVE Pu13LICATION43
Probability that a patent will issue

0.4375

Probability that neither will obtain a patent

0.5625

Average total (both firms) R&D expenditure

$3.000

Average expected payoff for each firm

$2.875

TABLE2: SYMMETRIC GAME WITH PREEMPTIVE PUBLICATION44
Probability that a patent will issue

0.1875

Probability of preemptive publication

0.2500

Probability of neither a patent nor publication

0.5625

Average total (both firms) R&D expenditure

$3.500

Average expected payoff for each firm

$2.125

A comparison of the two games reveals several important results.
First, the introduction of the option of preemptive publication did not
result in a decrease in R&D activity. On the contrary, the introduc
tion of preemptive publication led to a higher total investment in
R&D ($3.5 versus $3). Preemptive publication makes this possible
42. Thus, in a race without publication, a firm that rolls a 1 on its first turn will drop out
after spending $1 on R&D because it cannot possibly obtain a patent. ("Doing nothing" also
enables a firm to maintain trade secrecy protection.) In a race with publication, however, a
firm rolling a 1 on its first turn will still have an incentive to remain in the race if its oppo
nent has rolled a 4. The firm will spend the extra $1 to try and preempt its rival, thereby
earning a possible stake in the market
43. Of the 7/16 possible permutations in which either firm rolls an 8, each firm obtains
the patent 3 times outright, whereas they will split the single remaining possibility. Further
more, because a firm has a 0.5 chance of rolling a 1 on its first turn, each firm will spend an
average of $1.50 on R&D. Therefore, the average expected payoff is: [(-$1.50) + (3/16)($20)
+ (1/16)($10)]
$2.875.
=

44.

With preemptive publication, the rival firm will preemptively publish, thus thwarting
4 of the 7 chances to obtain a patent; therefore, each firm has a 1/16 chance of winning the
patent outright, and a 1/16 chance of splitting the patent Because a firm rolling a 1 will
spend an extra $1 whenever its rival rolls a 4, each firm will spend an average of $1.75 on
R&D. Therefore, the average expected payoff for each firm is: [(-$1.75) + (4/16)($8) +
(1/16)($20) + (1116)($10)] $2.125.
=
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because the firm that initially obtained poor research results has an in
centive to carry on with the research in the hope of spoiling a patent
for its rival by obtaining publishable results at some later stage. As
the model illustrates, in a game without publication, the dominant
strategy for a firm getting a 1 on the first roll is to quit after this round.
Not so in a game that allows for publication since a roll of4 gives it a
positive payoff.45 Consequently, the availability of preemptive publi
cation in this setting produces additional investment originating with
the trailing firm; thus, when preemptive publication is allowed, we
should expect a higher level of expenditure on R&D from firms that
would otherwise quit the race.
Second, under both regimes new information is disclosed to the
public 43.75% of the time. This implies that the introduction of pre
emptive publication does not necessarily diminish the amount of in
formation made available to the public. Yet, while under the first re
gime information is always disclosed with the societal deadweight cost
resulting from patent protection, the second regime imposes a dead
weight loss only 18.75% of the time, while disclosing information 25%
of the time at no societal cost. Furthermore, when the disclosure re
sults from publication rather than from patent protection, the informa
tion may be used costlessly by other firms for their respective research
projects. Hence, preemptive publication reduces the cost of informa
tion to society and other firms.
Preemptive publication also has the salutary effect of shifting the
timing of disclosure. As explained earlier, the stage at which a firm
may publish always precedes the stage at which it may file for a patent.
Publication becomes possible when a firm possesses sufficient theo
retical knowledge to enable an invention. Patenting requires reduc
tion of this knowledge to practice. In addition, a firm choosing to pat
ent must also satisfy the necessary legal requirements for obtaining a
patent. Hence, even from the inventor's point of view, there is a time
lag between the publication stage and the patenting stage. From a so
cietal standpoint, however, the lag is much greater. The information
contained in a patent application becomes available to the public only
after the Patent Office examines the patent and approves it. The ex
amination takes 18 months, on average, and is conducted under abso
lute secrecy.46 As a result, information in publications reaches the
market considerably earlier than does information in patent applica45. Of course, in reality the decision of how much R&D to conduct ultimately depends
on the value of the patent Still, in a "winner take all" game, a firm that fell behind in the
early stages of research may rationally decide to drop out of the race since its probability of
ultimately beating its rivals may not justify the additional investment in R&D. Formally this
happens when X> P(Pt).
46. See Scott Erickson, Patent Law and New Product Development: Does Priority Claim
Basis Makes a Difference?, 36 AM. Bus. LJ. 327, 336 {1999) (noting that the average proc
essing time of a patent application in the United States is eighteen months).
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tions.47 The sooner new information becomes public, the sooner it
may be put to valuable uses, and, consequently, the more socially
valuable it is.
Finally, it should be noted that the possibility of preemptive publi
cation reduces the average expected payoff of the firms in the race
(from $2.875 to $2.125). This indicates that the introduction of pre
emptive publication may erode the incentive to engage in patent races,
and more generally in R&D. Thus, at the margin, the possibility of
preemptive publication may deter firms from initiating certain re
search projects, and thus adversely affect innovation.
B.

Model ofan Asymmetric Race

To make the game more closely resemble commercial reality, I will
assume in this Section that the firms in the race diverge in their likeli
hoods of obtaining the patent. The difference may be due to superior
human resources, higher investment in R&D, or an earlier start on the
research. Each gives a firm an advantage over its opponents, increas
ing its chance of winning the race. To incorporate the divergence be
tween the firms into the model, I will assume in this Section that firm
B
the better endowed firm - rolls a loaded die with a 0.67 prob
ability of yielding 4 and 0.33 probability of yielding 1,48 while firm A
rolls a die yielding 1 and 4 with equal probability. The higher prob
ability of drawing a 4 - that is, of reaching a patentable result - is
the only difference between the games; the payoffs of the players, the
play order, and the decision menu remain the same. Once again, I will
solve the game under two legal regimes, one that does not take publi
cation into account and one that does. The equilibria of the game
without publication are listed in Table 3, and the equilibria of the
game with publication are listed in Table 4.
-

47. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotech
nology Research, 'J7 YALE LJ. 177, 207 (1987) {"Patent disclosure is unlikely to occur until
after a patent issues, which is often years later than disclosure to the scientific community
would otherwise occur." (citation omitted)).
48. This will happen when the number 4 appears on four of the faces of the die, and the
number 1 only on two.
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TABLE 3: ASYMMETRIC GAME WITIIOUT
PREEMPTIVE PUBLICATION49
Probability that a patent will issue

0.5833

Probability that neither will obtain a patent

0.4167

Average total (both firms) R&D expenditure

$3.167

Average expected payoff A, B

$2.389, $6.108

TABLE 4: ASYMMETRIC GAME WITH PREEMPTIVE PUBLICATION50
Probability that a patent will issue

0.2500

Probability that neither will obtain a patent

0.3333

Probability of neither a patent nor publication

0.4167

Average total (both firms) R&D expenditure

$3.667

Average expected payoff A, B

$2.500, $4.164

Analyzing the equilibria of the game reveals that the introduction
of asymmetry impacts the race in two ways. First, it slightly increases
the publication-to-patenting ratio relative to the symmetric game.
Such an increase should be expected whenever the firm leading the
race is likely to receive the patent. The more likely the leading firm
will obtain a patent, the more valuable becomes the strategy of pre
emptive publication to the trailing firm Since spoiling a patent to a
rival is both easier and less expensive than beating the rival to the pat
ent, the firm trailing in the race will focus its efforts on obtaining pub
lishable results to block a patent for the other firm
.

.

49. A patent will issue in 21/36 possible two roll permutations (given the weighted die)
- 12 times to firm B, 5 times to firm A, and 4 times it will be split. Because firm B has a 2/3
chance of rolling a 4, it will spend the full $2 two·thirds of the time. Thus, unlike firm A
which will maintain the $1.500 expenditure, firm B will spend an average of $1.667. The to
tal expected payoff for firm A will be: [(·$1.50) + (5/36)($20) +(4/36)($10)) $2.389. The
total expected payoff for firm B will be: [(-$1.67) + (12/36)($20) + (4/36)($10)) $6.108.
=

=

50. Firm A will be able to preempt 2/3 of B's patents, thus giving B a patent only 6/36
times, while forcing a duopoly profit 8/36 times. Firm B, on the other hand, will be able to
preempt 4/5 of A's patents, leaving A with a patent 1/36 times, while forcing a duopoly profit
4136 times. Furthermore, both A and B will spend the same amount on R&D, choosing to
pay the extra dollar 5/6 of the time. Thus, each spends an average of $1.833 on R&D. As
compared with the asymmetric race without publication, firm B loses [(8/36)($12) + ($1.833
$1.667)] $2.833, while it gains (4/36)($8) $0.889 from preempting firm A. Thus, its total
expected payoff is: [$6.108 + $0.889 $2.833)
$4.164. Firm A, however, loses only
[(4/36)($12) + ($1.833 $1.500)) $1.667, but gains (8/36)($8) $1.778. Thus, its total ex
pected payoff is: [$2.389 + $1.778 $1.667) $2.500.
•

=

=

·

•

=

=

•

=

=
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Second, a comparison of the expected average payoffs of the firms
shows that the introduction of publication reduces the average payoff
of the superior firm, far more than it does the payoff of the inferior
firm. In fact, in the above scenario, firm B suffered over a 30% drop
in its average expected payoff, whereas firm A enjoyed an almost 5 %
gain.51 This result confirms the intuition that preemptive publication
advantages the firm trailing in the race. The firm leading the race will
choose, in most cases, the option of patenting - particularly if it em
ploys superior researchers and faces no financing constraints. For
such a firm, publishing is self-defeating. For the trailing firm, on the
other hand, publication is often the profit-maximizing strategy.
The disparate impact of preemptive publication on the average ex
pected payoffs of the firms has both distributive and efficiency impli
cations. From a distributive standpoint, the availability of preemptive
publication transforms patent races from a "winner take all" to a
"multiple winner" race, making patent races more egalitarian than
commonly believed. From an efficiency perspective, the exact effect
depends on the potential race participants' attitude towards risk. If
inventors are risk averse, they will be more willing to participate in
patent races. If, on the other hand, they are risk seeking, they will
have less motivation to join.52 Finally, if the firms are risk neutral,
they will simply respond to the decline in average expected payoffs by
lowering their investment in R&D. (Of course, all three kinds of
companies would lower their R&D investment. Their relative disposi
tions therefore determine "by how much?".) Yet, the reduction made
by each of the firms will be different.
The sharper decline in the expected average payoff of the leading
firm suggests that when publication is available, the firms most likely
to win the race will invest substantially less in R&D than under a no
publication regime. It is impossible, however, to infer in the abstract
how this reduction will actually affect social welfare; it is impossible to
know whether the advantage of the leading firm is attributable to its
superior research ability, better financing, initial headstart, or simply
luck. The exact impact of preemptive publication on efficiency ulti
mately turns on the circumstances of each inventive race and the char
acteristics of the competing firms. All that can be predicted is that in
the very rare case in which all firms start the race at the same time, the
possibility of preemptive publication will tend to favor smaller, lesser
endowed firms relative to their larger, better-endowed competitors.53

51. Whether and how much of an increase the inferior firm will realize with the possi
bility of preemptive publication depends on the relative advantage of the superior firm
.

52. For an argument that participants in patent races are risk seeking, see John S.
McGee, Patent Exploitation: Some Economic and Legal Problems, 9 J L & ECON. 135, 136
(1966).
53. However, even in this case, the smaller firm may serendipitously. get to the invention
first.
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PREEMPTIVE PUBLICATION AND SOCIAL WELFARE

In analyzing the welfare effects of preemptive publication, I will
proceed under two alternative assumptions. First, I will assume that
no bargaining between the competing firms is possible, and thus the
firm trailing in the race will always publish the information it possesses
when doing so spoils a patent for the other firm. Then, I will reverse
the initial assumption to enable bargaining between the firms prior to
the act of publication.
A

No Bargaining Regime

Recognizing the availability of preemptive publication reveals sev
eral implications for our understanding of the welfare effects of the
patent system. The realization that in many cases utility-maximizing
firms, acting in their own self-interest, may choose to make valuable
information available to the public even without receiving a patent
challenges the conventional assumption that the patent system induces
disclosure of information solely through a limited monopoly reward.
As this Article demonstrates, the threat of not being rewarded namely, not receiving a patent - may be as effective an inducement to
disclose information as the prospect of reward. In the former case, the
disclosure occurs through a regular publication, in the latter, through
the patent grant. It bears emphasis, though, that the two means of dis
closure have different efficiency effects.
Publication avoids the societal deadweight loss generated by pat
ents since it makes the information available at no direct cost. Signifi
cantly, it circumvents the troublesome tradeoff underlying patent law:
new information in exchange for limited monopoly power. Further
more, disclosure by publication allows third parties to exploit the new
information considerably earlier than they could in the case of disclo
sure by patent. Also, the absence of patent protection obviates the
need to bargain for the right to use the information, and thus reduces
transaction costs. Yet, the effect of preemptive publication on societal
welfare is not strictly positive. The availability of preemptive publica
tion reduces the expected average payoffs of the race participants and
may consequently diminish, in some cases, the ex ante incentive to en
gage in R&D.54 In addition, the possibility of preemptive publication
forces race participants to expend resources on monitoring the prog
ress of other competitors. Rather than focusing all research efforts on
developing the invention, firms will have to divide those efforts be
tween conducting their own research and monitoring competitors' re
search activities. Although such monitoring is not entirely wasteful, it
54. The exact impact of preemptive publication depends on the competing firms' atti
tudes towards risk.
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is an additional cost that will slow down the development of new
products and processes. Thus, preemptive publication represents a
tradeoff between ex ante and ex post efficiency, a tradeoff that has be
come the hallmark of intellectual property law.
Notwithstanding this tradeoff, preemptive publication is likely to
promote societal welfare in at least two inventive settings. First, the
strategy of preemptive publication offers strong benefits in research
areas whose development depends on uninhibited access to basic re
search. Biotechnology provides an example55 - publication of re
search findings ensures access to basic research results and thus miti
gates the threat of overappropriation of essential knowledge.56 A
similar effect may be expected in other fields as well. Because patent
races will more likely occur with respect to socially important inven
tions, recourse to preemptive publication may block the appropriation
of fundamental developments and force firms to compete for variants
of such inventions, or, as they are called in the patent vernacular, im
provements.
Second, and relatedly, preemptive publication should be particu
larly desirable when network effects are present. Network effects ex
ist in a market when the value of the good traded increases with the
number of users.57 The paradigmatic examples of network goods are
communication goods, such as telephones, fax machines, and even
personal computers. The realization of network externalities depends
on the establishment of compatible technologies. Without such a
standard, potential networks will not come to pass. For instance, if
Internet Service Providers used different, incompatible technological
standards, the Internet, as we know it, would not exist. Patents pose
an obvious threat to network markets. The appropriation of a certain
technology by one firm will often force other firms to develop other,
incompatible technologies in order to circumvent the patent.58 In the
process, potential positive network effects will be lost. Preemptive
publication can alleviate some of this problem. Specifically, preemp-

55. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) (arguing that the recent
proliferation of fragmented intellectual property rights may result in a biomedical anticom
mons, which will lead, in turn, to underuse of resources and knowledge).
56. In fact, the field of biotechnology developed around two basic discoveries for which
no patent protection was claimed. The first was Kohler and Milstein's discovery of a tech
nique of producing antibodies. The second was Cohen and Boyer's discovery of a technique
for expression of recombinant proteins. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R Nelson, On the
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 905-06 (1990).
57. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Com
patibility, 15 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985). For a comprehensive analysis of the potential
implications of network externalities to various legal fields, see Mark A. Lemley & David
McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998).
58. On the relationship between networks and innovation, see Joseph Farrel & Gather
Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70 (1985).
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tive publication may be used to safeguard against the appropriation of
basic technological standards and thus facilitate the creation of tech
nological networks.
Furthermore, the availability of preemptive publication also bears
directly on the question of optimizing R&D investment. Several
leading economists have criticized the patent system for inducing
overinvestment in R&D.59 However, the criticism relies on the con
ventional assumption that firms in a patent race face only the risk of
being beaten to the patent (Type I risk). In reality, firms also face the
risk of preemptive publication (Type II risk). By ignoring the possi
bility of preemptive publication, conventional theorizing has underes
timated the actual risk involved in patent races and, as a result, may
have overstated the overinvestment problem.60
Although one might intuit that the availability of preemptive pub
lication would mitigate the overinvestment problem, the exact effect
of preemptive publication on R&D investment is indeterminable in
the abstract. The possibility of preemptive publication is at once a risk
and an opportunity, depending on the firm's position in the race. For
the firm likely to win the race, preemptive publication represents a
risk; for the other firms, it is an opportunity. In perfectly symmetric
races, where luck determines the winner and the loser, the opposing
effects of preemptive publication offset one another.61 Yet, because
the availability of preemptive publication reduces the average ex
pected payoffs, both the winner and the loser should invest less in
R&D than they would otherwise.
In asymmetric races the situation is different. In such races, the
strategy of preemptive publication presents trailing firms with a
unique opportunity to remain competitive without winning the patent.
The availability of preemptive publication may induce firms that
would otherwise drop out of the race to remain in it; worse, it may at
tract to patent races firms that otherwise would not have entered them
at all. Whereas from the point of view of each individual firm, joining
the race might be a profit-enhancing strategy, it is clearly wasteful in
the aggregate, since it leads to duplicative research expenditures. This

59. See, e.g., Yoram Barze!, Optimal Timing of Inventions, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348
(1968); Dasgupta & Stiglitz, supra note 1, at 13-14; Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social
Value of Information and the Reward to Incentive Activity, 61 AM ECON. REV. 561, 571-72
(1971); Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Re
search Contracts, 73 AM ECON. REV. 691, 703 (1983) (asserting that unlimited patents will
lead to overinvestment in R&D).
.

.

60. Note, however, that this Article does not suggest that there is no overinvestment
problem. That is a complex question that lies beyond the scope of this Article. I claim only
that because of the risk of preemptive publication, the amount of overinvestment may be
smaller than presently believed.
61. In such races, no firm can know ex ante whether it will be harmed or benefited by
the availability of preemptive publication.
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observation lends support to the criticism that the patent system leads
to overinvestment in R&D. Importantly, however, it identifies a new
source of overinvestment: the desire to preempt a rival.
But what about the leading firm? The leading firm's motivation in
patent races is different from that of the others. Generally speaking,
the leader's profit-maximizing strategy is to try and win; that of the
other firms is simply not to lose. Hence, for the leading firm the pos
sibility of preemptive publication offers a potential risk. The leading
firm can respond to the risk of preemptive publication in one of two
opposing ways. First, it may increase its investment in R&D in order
to obtain the patent faster and thus minimize the risk of preemption.
Second, it may lower its investment in R&D out of fear of being pre
empted. In the latter case, the availability of preemptive publication
leads to a perverse result: it reduces the R&D investment of the firm
most likely to win the race, while it increases the investment of other
firms.62 This result may explain the disparity between the private
value and social value of certain inventions.63
The possibility of preemptive publication potentially transforms
patent races from competitions for one large prize into competitions
with multiple prizes. The exact number of "winners" ultimately de
pends on the respective research capabilities of the firms, the time at
which they joined the race, and the "size" of the legal nonobviousness
standard. The respective payoffs to the firms depend on both the
value of the patent and the returns from preemptive publication. The
availability of bargaining also bears on the payoffs of firms in patent
races. It is to this factor that I now turn.

is

62. This result made possible by the imperfect information firms have about their po
tential competitors. Having insufficient information about its competitors, the leading
may overestimate its own ability to beat its competitor to the patent, or merely to beat its
competitor's publication. The strategy of increasing the investment runs the risk of being
undercapitalized in future projects if the
ultimately unsuccessful in obtaining the pat
ent.

firm

firm is

However, it is important to note that the risk of preemptive publication is by no means
the only reason for the observed disparity between the private and social value of certain
inventions. Nor is it the most significant one. The main reason for this disparity is the im
perfect enforceability of patents. Because patents are not perfectly enforceable, patents
generate spillovers. While this result is desirable ex post, it undermines the ex ante incentive
of inventors to invest in R&D and thus drives a wedge between the social value of the inven
tion and its private value. Cf. Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market

Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and
Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985 (1999) (arguing that encouraging limited
amounts of patent infringement while extending patent duration may "substantially reduce
the distortionary ex post effects of supracompetitive pricing without reducing the patentee's
ex ante incentives to innovate").

63. See, e.g., Timothy F. Bresnahan, Measuring the Spillovers from Technical Advance:
Mainframe Computers in Financial Services, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 742, 753 (1986); Michael
Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 QJ. ECON. 1137,
1141 (1998); Edwin Mansfield et al., Social and Private Rates of Return from Industrial Inno
vations, 91 QJ. ECON. 221, 234 (1977).
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Enter Bargaining

The availability of bargaining introduces an important element
into the analysis.64 Rather than spoiling a patent to a rival by publish
ing its research results, the trailing firm can contact the leader and
threaten to publish. Since such a threat may clearly be credible, the
recipient will not be able simply to ignore it and will have to inquire
into the nature of the threat. If the threat is credible, the intended
patentee will have to "bribe" the other firm to prevent it from pub
lishing. The two firms will then negotiate in order to strike a mutually
beneficial deal. Assuming Coasean bargaining under conditions of
equal bargaining power, the intended publisher and intended patentee
will divide the contractual surplus evenly between them. Under the
assumptions of the model in Section II.B, the amount of the "bribe" in
such a case would be $10.65 While this side-payment is a pure lump
sum transfer that does not affect the marginal cost of producing the
patented product, it does affect the average expected payoffs of the
firms.
When the possibility of Coasean bargaining is introduced into the
asymmetric race in Section II.B, the expected average payoff of the
better-endowed firm - firm B in the model - is $4.84, and that of
firm A is $3.17. As one would expect, the availability of bargaining in
creases the payoffs of the firms relative to a regime with publication
but no bargaining - in which case, the expected payoffs of firms A
and B are $2.500 and $4.165, respectively. Thus, the introduction of
bargaining mitigates to some extent the effect of preemptive publica
tion on the investment decisions of the firms.66
Bargaining may either occur ex ante, before research begins, or ex
post, after the firms assume their respective positions in the race. The
main advantage of ex ante bargaining is that it allows firms to consoli
date otherwise duplicative research efforts. Rather than competing
head-on against each other, risking the possibility of preemption, firms

64. Again, the analysis in this Section does not address the various antitrust ramifica
tions of coordinated R&D. Negotiations between firms to coordinate may violate the
Sherman Act depending on the market power of the participants and the importance of the
research. Yet, the exact antitrust implications of coordinated research cannot be determined
in the abstract.

65. Under this model, payoffs in the case of a patent are $20 to the patenting firm and $0
to the other firm. The payoff in the case of publication is $8 to each of the firms. Thus, un
der an assumption of equal bargaining powers, the intended patentees will have to pay the
other firm 8 + 05(12 8) 10. Formally, the result of this bargaining game can be described
as follows: Let denote bargaining power such that 0 < < 1. For any , the amount of the
side-payment would be 8 + (4). A necessary condition of bargaining in this case is that the
payoff from publication be smaller than half the value of the patent.
-

=

66. Yet, even after the introduction of bargaining, the average expected payoffs of the

firms are lower than what they would be without publication - in which case, the expected
payoffs of firms A and B are $2.388 and $6.277, respectively.
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may identify their strongest rivals in advance and try to cooperate with
them. Such cooperation holds out several benefits for the firms and
for society at large. From the firms' perspective, consolidation of re
search efforts increases the likelihood of success in R&D while low
ering the cost of research.67 Both effects are also desirable from a so
cietal standpoint. Coordination of research efforts not only increases
the likelihood of success, but also enhances the speed of research and
the dissemination of information. The earlier a patent issues, the
sooner society receives new information. Likewise, the cost reduction
wrought by consolidated research economizes on valuable resources,
freeing them for other desirable goals. Yet, the possibility of Coasean
bargaining has its vices.
Coasean bargaining delays the disclosure of information to the
public relative to a "no bargaining" regime, and when the information
is finally disclosed, it happens at the cost of social deadweight loss as
sociated with patent protection. Thus, Coasean bargaining effectively
eliminates the potential ex post benefits of preemptive publication under Coasean bargaining no publication would ever occur. Impor
tantly, however, there are powerful reasons to believe that Coasean
bargaining is not very likely in the present context.
For Coasean bargaining to occur, firms must possess perfect in
formation about each other's research plans and accomplishments.
Such perfect information, however, would only be available if research
activity were completely transparent. This is far from the case in the
real world. In fact, firms actively protect information about their
R&D efforts, even taking special precautions to prevent inadvertent
leaks. As Arrow demonstrated in explaining the need for patent pro
tection, bargaining over unprotected information is very unlikely to
occur.68 The stakes involved are simply too high. Furthermore, in the
absence of transparency, firms will often be unable to ascertain which
publication threats are real and which are not. A firm that agreed to
pay off one competitor may find itself inundated with threats from
others, all requiring the same treatment.69 Sifting out the real from the
fake threats may often turn out to be impossible, and almost always

67. Because ex ante contracting occurs before costs are sunk, it lowers the cost of
achieving cooperation relative to ex post negotiations. It should be noted, however, that ex
ante coordination may give rise to potential antitrust liability for the firms involved.
68. Specifically, Arrow identified the following problem: Without disclosing the infor
mation she obtains, the initial holder will not be able to sell or license it to potential buyers;
but once the information has been disclosed, she has nothing left to sell or license. See
Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF lNvENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 615 (1962).
69. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights
and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 C AL. L. REV. 1293, 1305-06 (1996) (demonstrating
the inability of intellectual property owners to distinguish between credible and noncredible
threats of infringements).
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too time-consuming. Thus, it will likely be in the patenting firm's best
interest not to bargain at all, even if doing so runs the risk of being
preempted.
Advance coordination in the form of joint ventures avoids some of
the pitfalls of ex post bargaining, but it too is not problem-free. Since
collaborating with all potential preemptors is impracticable, each firm
would have to choose its research partners carefully. However, identi
fying the right research partners is a tricky task, and the excluded
firms may respond by forming rival coalitions to remain competitive.
Thus, although coordination benefits society by reducing the number
of duplicative research efforts, it does not necessarily eliminate the
risk of preemptive publication. At the end of the day, bargaining and
cooperation will not always assuage the risk of preemptive publica
tion.
IV. THE D OUBLE PREEMPTION TwlST
In order to shelter itself from the risk of preemption, the intended
patentee can employ the defense tactic of publishing its own research
results and then filing for a patent within one year of the date of publi
cation. Section 102(b) of the Patent Act grants a one-year grace pe
riod in which the publisher can file for a patent, thus effectively ena
bling the patentee to preempt the preemptor. The one-year grace
period established by § 102(b) has traditionally been understood to
encourage early disclosure of information by patent applicants.70 Yet,
the traditional rationale makes very little sense when the possibility of
preemptive publication is ignored. Section 102(b) provides patent ap
plicants with a very limited incentive to disclose earlier. Granted,
early disclosure enables firms to gain a better estimate of the value of
the invention prior to the patent's approval, to enter licensing agree
ments, and to satisfy the desire of researchers to publish as early as
possible. Yet, absent a more substantial inducement, foregoing publi
cation is actually the better option for patent applicants, since publica
tion divests them of the natural protection of secrecy. Because inven
tors can never be certain of receiving the patent, their profit
maximizing strategy at this point is not to publish. Not only does early
publication force them to file within one year, it also provides impor
tant information to rivals. Furthermore, because § 102(b) is uniquely
American, early publication will hurt the publishing firms in foreign
markets. Hence, when preemptive publication is ignored, § 102(b)
seems puzzling.
70. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d SS, 61 {Ct. a. 1981) (stating
that one of the rationales for enacting the section is a "policy favoring prompt and wide
spread disclosure of new inventions to the public"); see also Patrick J. Barrett, Note, New
Guidelines for Applying the On Sale Bar to Patentability, 24 STAN. L. REV. 730, 732-35
(1972).
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The possibility of preemptive publication solves the puzzle by pro
viding the inducement wanting in the traditional rationale. Faced with
the possibility of being preempted, the intended patentee may find it
in her best interest to publish first so as to neutralize the risk of publi
cation by a rival. Publishing first eliminates the risk of preemption,
but only at the cost _ of loss of secrecy. Consequently, in deciding
whether or not to publish prior to filing, the intended patentee must
evaluate the risk of preemption against the risk of failing to receive
the patent,71 and respond to the more imminent one. Patentees will,
therefore, publish only if doing so is necessary to preempt publication
by a rival.
An early publication by a patent applicant benefits society by
moving forward the date of disclosure. In the absence of such a publi
cation, the patentee will reveal the information to the public only
when the patent issues, which in most cases will delay disclosure by
approximately a year and a half.72 The early disclosure, in the case of
publication, enables other firms to put the information to new valu
able uses sooner than they otherwise could and, in particular, to start
developing improvements. Because in most cases the information dis
closed by patent applicants will become protected by a patent less than
a year after the date of publication, however, users will face the need
to negotiate a mutually agreeable deal with the patent grantee. As a
result, early publication by patent applicants does not provide free ac
cess to the information contained in the publication. Even so, earlier
disclosure is welfare-enhancing as it accelerates the pace of innova
tion.
·

CONCLUSION
The main goal of this Article has been to challenge the prevailing
theory of patent races and its ability to aptly capture the inventive
process. Standard theorizing models the inventive process as a race
between two firms that results in one of two outcomes - neither firm
reaches a patentable result, or one of the firms obtains the patent; no
intermediate outcomes are considered. Yet, this analysis is flawed.
While the firm ahead in the race will naturally do its best to obtain the
patent and enjoy the legal monopoly that accompanies this achieve
ment, the trailing firm will do whatever it can to prevent this from
happening. To this end, the firm trailing in the race will utilize the

71. A famous case that illustrates this point is In re O'Farrel, 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir.
1988). In this case, two of the three patent applicants had reported their research findings in
a scientific paper that came out more than a year before the filing date. In determining the
validity of the patent, the Federal Circuit ruled that because the publication occurred more
than a year prior to the date of filings, it rendered the invention obvious, and thus precluded
the patent.
72. See Erickson, supra note 46.
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only strategy the .Jaw makes available to it: it will publish its research
findings in order to move the goalposts of nonobviousness for its rival.
When this occurs, patent races may result in an equilibrium where no
patent issues, but new information is disclosed.
The strategy of preemptive publication significantly alters existing
understanding of patent races and their efficiency effects. The avail
ability of preemptive publication transforms patent races from a "win
ner take all" to a "multiple winners" game. This transformation af
fects the risk involved in patent races, the investment decisions of the
firms, and the cost of innovation to both the firms and the public at
large. As is often the case with patents, the tradeoff between ex ante
and ex post efficiency implicated by patent protection makes it diffi
cult to determine in the abstract whether, on balance, the impact of
the availability of preemptive publication on aggregate efficiency is
positive or negative. Thus, a more thorough understanding of the wel
fare implications of preemptive publication requires empirical study.
Yet, even the analysis presented in this Article has important norma
tive implications for policymakers.
Determining the correct nonobviousness standard is the key to ef
ficient innovation policy. A modest nonobviousness requirement
would inefficiently reward infinitesimal innovation.
A higher
nonobviousness standard would appear to serve society better by fil
tering out relatively trivial inventions. Yet, as this Article shows, the
possibility of preemptive publication changes the analysis. The higher
the nonobviousness bar, the more likely preemptive publication will
occur. Thus, courts must take into account the possibility of preemp
tive publication in determining the socially optimal nonobviousness
standard. Naturally, legislation may enhance or diminish the possibil
ity for preemptive publication. For instance, requiring that publica
tion occur at least a year prior to the date of invention in order to pre
empt . the patent would reduce the opportunity for preemptive
publication. Conversely, allowing such publication to occur any time
prior to the filing date would enhance instances of preemptive publica
tion. Moreover, different rules may be devised for different industries,
depending on the desirability of preemptive publication in each inven
tive setting.
While these determinations are of extreme importance to innova
tion policy, they lie outside of the purview of this Article. Yet, this
Article's discussion of the various efficiency implications of preemp
tive publication should prove helpful to policymakers in making those
determinations. If the analysis in this Article is correct, it shows that,
at the end of the day, the realities of patent races and academic pro
motion are not so far apart.

